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Abstract. This paper extends the core results of discrete time infinite horizon dy-
namic programming theory to the case of state-dependent discounting. The tradi-
tional constant-discount condition requires that the discount factor of the controller
is strictly less than one. Here we replace the constant factor with a discount factor
process and require, in essence, that the process is strictly less than one on average
in the long run. We prove that, under this condition, the standard optimality results
can be recovered, including Bellman’s principle of optimality, convergence of value
function iteration and convergence of policy function iteration. We also show that
the condition cannot be weakened in many standard settings. The dynamic program-
ming framework considered in the paper is general enough to contain features such
as recursive preferences. Several applications are discussed.
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Driven by the need to better match a variety of empirical phenomena, researchers
in economics and finance now routinely adopt settings where the subjective discount
rate used by agents in their models varies with the state. For example, Albuquerque
et al. (2016) propose an asset pricing model in which the one-period discount factor
follows an AR(1) process. They show that the resulting demand shocks help explain
the equity premium puzzle. Mehra and Sah (2002) find that small fluctuations in
agents’ discount factors can have large effect on equity price volatility. Other studies
of asset pricing with state-dependent discount factors embedded in preferences include
Campbell (1986), Albuquerque et al. (2015) and Schorfheide et al. (2018).
State-dependent and time-varying discount rates are also common in studies of savings,
income and wealth. An early example is Krusell and Smith (1998). More recently,
Krusell et al. (2009) model the discount factor process as a three state Markov chain
and show how discount factor dispersion helps their heterogeneous agent model match
1We thank Andrzej Nowak for his helpful comments. The first author gratefully acknowledges
financial support from ARC grant FT160100423.
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2the wealth distribution. Hubmer et al. (2018) model discount factor dynamics using a
discretized AR(1) process. Fagereng et al. (2019) use time-varying discount rates and
portfolio adjustment frictions to explain the positive correlation between savings rates
and wealth observed in Norwegian panel data.
State-dependent discounting is also found in analysis of fiscal and monetary policy. For
example, Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) study monetary policy in the presence of
zero lower bound restrictions with dynamic time preference shocks. Woodford (2011)
considers the government expenditure multiplier in a similar environment. Eggertsson
(2011) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) study the effect of fiscal policies
at the zero lower bound on interest rates, while Nakata and Tanaka (2016) analyze the
term structure of interest rates at the zero lower bound when agents have recursive
preferences. In all of these models, state-dependent variation in discount rates plays a
significant role.2
Among other fields, state-dependent discounting is also used regularly in studies of the
business cycle and macroeconomic volatility. For example, Primiceri et al. (2006) argue
that shocks to agents’ rates of intertemporal substitution are a key source of macroe-
conomic fluctuations. Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) study the shifts in the volatility
of macroeconomic variables in the US and find that a large portion of consumption
volatility can be attributable to the variance in discount factors.3
In labor economics, state-dependent discounting has been adopted to help explain
the excess unemployment volatility puzzle discussed in Shimer (2005). For example,
Mukoyama (2009) enhances the Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides model with state de-
pendent discount factors for entrepreneurs and workers, which is then shown to increase
unemployment volatility. Related analysis and extensions can be found in Beraja et al.
(2016), Hall (2017) and Kehoe et al. (2018).
The standard theory of infinite horizon dynamic programming (also called the theory
of Markov decision processes; see, e.g., Bellman (1957), Blackwell (1965), Stokey et al.
(1989), Puterman (2014) or Bertsekas (2017)) does not accommodate state-dependent
discounting. Instead, it assumes either zero discounting (and considers long-run av-
erage optimality) or a constant and positive discount rate, which corresponds to a
discount factor strictly less than one. This implies that, in the canonical setting, the
Bellman operator satisfies the conditions of Banach’s contraction mapping theorem.
2Additional work from the same field with state-dependent discounting can be found in Correia
et al. (2013), Hills et al. (2016), Hills and Nakata (2018) and Williamson (2019).
3Additional research in a similar vein can be found in Justiniano et al. (2010), Justiniano et al.
(2011), Christiano et al. (2014), Saijo (2017), and Bhandari et al. (2013).
3This contractive property in turn provides the foundations for a powerful optimality
theory.
In this paper, we reconsider the theory of infinite horizon discrete time dynamic pro-
gramming when the usual constant discount factor β is replaced by a discount factor
process {βt}. We then replace the traditional condition β < 1 for the constant discount
case with the more general condition r(Lβ) < 1, where r(Lβ) is the spectral radius of
an operator generated by {βt}. We show that, when this condition holds, the value
function satisfies the Bellman equation, an optimal policy exists, and Bellman’s prin-
ciple of optimality is valid. Moreover, value function iteration converges to the value
function, as it does in the standard case, and Howard’s policy iteration algorithm is
also convergent. We consider several applications of the theory, ranging from simple
household problems to recursive preference models and optimal stopping problems. We
finish with some extensions related to unbounded rewards.
The condition r(Lβ) < 1 is, in several ways, the most natural generalization of the
standard condition β < 1 from the constant discount case. For example, if {βt}
happens to be constant at some value β, then, as we show below, r(Lβ) = β, so that,
in particular r(Lβ) < 1 if and only if β < 1. More generally, if {βt} is iid with
common mean β¯, then r(Lβ) = β¯. At the same time, if {βt} is positively correlated,
then, as we show below, r(Lβ) tends to increase not just with the unconditional mean
of the process {βt}, but also, with the strength of correlation and the amount of
volatility. This provides insight not just into the determination of r(Lβ), but also into
the strength of discounting as perceived by the controller across different specifications
of the discount factor process.
We show that, unless one focuses on special cases, the condition r(Lβ) < 1 cannot be
significantly weakened. This matters for two reasons. One is that the theoretical results
contained here have some permanent relevance. The other is that the weakness of the
condition allows us to treat topical applications in the quantitative research literature.
For example, the condition r(Lβ) < 1 does not rule out the possibility that βt > 1 with
positive probability. This matters because, in some of the new Keynesian literature,
the discount factor is allowed to temporarily attain or exceed one so that the zero lower
bound on the nominal interest rates binds (see, e.g., Christiano et al. (2011), Eggertsson
(2011) or Correia et al. (2013)). Other studies use an AR(1) specification for the log
of the discount factor process (or the process itself), which allows the discount factor
to become arbitrarily large.4
4See, for example, Justiniano and Primiceri (2008), Justiniano et al. (2010), Justiniano et al.
(2011), Christiano et al. (2014), Saijo (2017) or Schorfheide et al. (2018). Although quantitative
4In terms of computation, when {βt} takes only finitely many values, r(Lβ) reduces to
the spectral radius of a matrix, and hence can be obtained by standard algorithms
from numerical linear algebra. If {βt} is a continuous process, then the same ideas can
be applied after discretization. One such application is considered in the paper.
This paper is not the first to reconsider dynamic programming problems when the
discount factor is allowed to vary over time. For example, Karni and Zilcha (2000)
study the saving behavior of agents with random discount factors in a steady-state
competitive equilibrium. Cao (2018) proves the existence of sequential and recursive
competitive equilibria in incomplete markets with aggregate shocks in which agents also
have state-dependent discount factors. In the mathematics literature, Wei and Guo
(2011), Carmon and Shwartz (2009), Minja´rez-Sosa (2015), Ilhuicatzi-Rolda´n et al.
(2017) and Gonza´lez-Sa´nchez et al. (2019) all address various issues in dynamic pro-
gramming with state-dependent discounting However, these papers assume that the
discount factor process in the dynamic program is bounded above by some constant b
such that b < 1. This is too strict for a range of valuable applications, as discussed
above.
One paper from the mathematics literature that admits state-dependent discounting
under weak conditions is Scha¨l (1975). He obtains some results on optimality, including
existence of optimal policies and Bellman’s principle of optimality, under a condition
that bounds the tail of expected discounted rewards. Although this condition is general,
it directly assumes that expected discounted rewards are finite under any Markov
policy, and hence restricts all primitives in the dynamic program simultaneously. This
makes the condition difficult to test it in applications. (No applications are provided in
the paper.) In contrast, our condition is designed to be weak enough to include all of the
economic applications listed above, while at the same time providing a simple, practical
condition that can be tested in applications. Another advantage of our approach is
that it allows for recursive preferences and unbounded rewards.
Our work is also related to several recent contributions in the literature on optimal
savings that allow for relatively general discount factor processes. For example, an
innovative study by Toda (2018) investigates an income fluctuation problem in which
the agent has CRRA utility and obtains a necessary and sufficient condition for the
existence of a solution to the optimal saving problem with state-dependent discount
implementations imply a finite upper bound, cases where βt > 1 with positive probability at the
benchmark parameterizations still occur. For example, Hills et al. (2016) assume that βt = ρβt−1 +
(1 − ρ)µ + µt, where µ = 0.996, ρ = 0.8, and σ = 0.0024. In their discretization, the largest value
for β is 1.006 (see p. 41).
5factors. The CRRA restriction is relaxed in Ma et al. (2019). However, their techniques
are based around methods for household problems that have no natural analog in
the general theory of dynamic programming considered here. Neither of these papers
attempts to provide a general theory of dynamic optimality when the discount rate can
vary.5
As one extension of our results, we consider the case where rewards can be unbounded—
a situation arises frequently in economics but introduces technical problems even in the
standard case. One line of argument draws on Alvarez and Stokey (1998), which treats
homogeneous dynamic programs when the discount factor is constant. A second line
of argument extends the local contraction method of Rinco´n-Zapatero and Rodr´ıguez-
Palmero (2003), Martins-da Rocha and Vailakis (2010), Matkowski and Nowak (2011),
and Jas´kiewicz and Nowak (2011) to the case of state-dependent discounting.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1 sets out the model. Section 2
provides our main results. Section 3 reviews our key assumption. Section 4 gives
applications, Section 5 discusses two extensions and Section 6 concludes.
1. A Dynamic Program
We begin with an extension of the abstract dynamic framework of Bertsekas (2013),
which can handle non-separable features such as recursive preferences. Throughout, if
Y is any metric space, then bmY and bcY denote the bounded (Borel) measurable and
bounded continuous functions from Y to R respectively.
1.1. Framework. The state of the world consists of a pair (x, z), where x represents a
set of endogenous variables, affected by the actions of an agent (the controller), and z is
an exogenous state. These variables take values in metric spaces X and Z respectively.
For convenience, we set S := X×Z. The agent responds to the current state by taking
action a from an action space A, which is a separable metric space. The choice a when
facing state (x, z), is restricted to Γ(x, z) ⊂ A, where Γ is the feasible correspondence.
Let gr Γ be all ((x, z), a) in S × A such that a is in Γ(x, z). In other words, gr Γ is all
feasible state-action pairs.
The exogenous state evolves according to a Markov transition kernel Q, so that Q(z,B)
represents the probability of transitioning to Borel set B ⊂ Z next period, given current
exogenous state z. Throughout, Ez represents expectation conditional on Z0 = z.
5Also relevant are Higashi et al. (2009), which provides an axiomatic foundation for preferences with
random discounting. Other work along this line includes Krishna and Sadowski (2014) and Higashi
et al. (2017).
6We combine the remaining elements of the dynamic programming problem into a single
continuation aggregator H, with the understanding that H(x, z, a, v) is the maximal
value that can be obtained from the present time under the continuation value function
v, given current state (x, z) and current action a. Thus, Bellman’s equation takes the
form
v(x, z) = sup
a∈Γ(x,z)
H(x, z, a, v). (1)
We take V to be a nonempty set of candidate value functions, each one of which is
required to be real-valued, measurable and defined on S. The continuation aggregator
H maps each (x, z, a, v) in gr Γ× V into a real number.
A dynamic program D is a tuple (X,Z,A,Γ, H,V) with the structure imposed above.
The next example illustrates in the context of a one-sector growth model.
Example 1.1. Consider the one-sector stochastic optimal growth model as found in,
say, Stokey et al. (1989), except that the discount rate is state-dependent. An agent
solves
max
{Ct,Kt}∞t=0
E
{ ∞∑
t=0
t−1∏
i=0
βi u(Ct)
}
(2)
subject to Ct = f(Kt, Zt) − Kt+1 > 0. Here βt = β(Zt) where β is a nonnegative
function, {Zt} is a discrete time Markov process with transition kernel Q, u is a one-
period return function and f is a production function. When interpreting (2), we
adopt the convention that
∏−1
i=0 βi = 1, and same convention is used for products over
all other sequences.
The Bellman equation is
v(k, z) = sup
06a6f(k,z)
{
u(f(k, z)− a) + β(z)
∫
v(a, z′)Q(z, dz′)
}
. (3)
This problem can be mapped to our framework by taking capital as the endogenous
state, z as the exogenous state and consumption as the action. The endogenous state
space X and the action space A can be set to R+, while Z to be some arbitrary metric
space. The feasible correspondence Γ(x, z) is all a such that 0 6 a 6 f(x, z), and
H(x, z, a, v) = u(f(x, z)− a) + β(z)
∫
v(a, z′)Q(z, dz′). (4)
While the same shock process {Zt} affects both production and the discount rate under
this formulation, there is no loss of generality because the shock space Z is arbitrary
and hence can support multiple independent processes.
71.2. Feasibility and Optimality. Given a dynamic program D, let Σ be the set
of feasible policies, defined as all Borel measurable maps σ from S to A such that
σ(x, z) ∈ Γ(x, z) for each (x, z) in S. Given each such σ, let Tσ be the operator on V
given by
(Tσv)(x, z) = H(x, z, σ(x, z), v). (5)
Define the Bellman operator T on V by
(Tv)(x, z) = sup
a∈Γ(x,z)
H(x, z, a, v). (6)
Given v0 in V and σ in Σ, we can interpret vn,σ(x, z) := (T nσ v0)(x, z) as the lifetime
payoff of an agent who starts at state (x, z), follows policy σ for n periods and uses v0
to evaluate the terminal state. The σ-value function for an infinite-horizon problem is
defined here as
vσ(x, z) := lim
n→∞
vn,σ(x, z).
The definition requires that this limit exists and is independent of v0. Below we impose
conditions such that this is always the case.
We define the value function corresponding to our dynamic program by
v∗(x, z) = sup
σ∈Σ
vσ(x, z) (7)
at each (x, z) in S. Existence of the value function requires that vσ is well defined for
each σ ∈ Σ, as well as some upper bound on the value that can be obtained from each
policy. When the value function does exist, as it will in our setting, a policy σ∗ ∈ Σ is
called optimal whenever it attains the supremum in (7), which is to say that
v∗(x, z) = vσ∗(x, z) (8)
at each (x, z) in S.
1.3. Regularity. To present sharp optimality results, it is useful to add some degree of
regularity via continuity and compactness. To this end, we define a dynamic program
D to be regular if
(a) the set of candidate value functions V equals bmS,
(b) the correspondence Γ is continuous, nonempty, and compact valued, and
(c) the map (x, z, a) 7→ H(x, z, a, v) is measurable for all v ∈ bmS, continuous for
all v ∈ bcS, and bounded for at least one v ∈ bcS.
Many standard cases from the literature are regular.
8Example 1.2. The optimal growth model in Example 1.1 is regular if u and f satisfy
standard conditions, such as those in Section 5.1 of Stokey et al. (1989), Z is compact,
β is a continuous function and Q is Feller.6
Example 1.3. All dynamic programs with finite state and action spaces are regular,
since conditions (a)–(c) are automatically satisfied when we endow both spaces with
the discrete topology.
(Although we obtain some fundamental dynamic programming results without regu-
larity, this discussion is left to extensions and the appendix.)
1.4. Key Assumptions. Consider the following restrictions for the dynamic program
D, the first of which is standard.
Assumption 1.1 (Monotonicity). If v, w ∈ V and v 6 w, then, for all (x, z) ∈ S and
a ∈ Γ(x, z), we have H(x, z, a, v) 6 H(x, z, a, w).
The importance of Assumption 1.1 is well known (see, e.g., Bertsekas, 2013, Chapter 2).
It clearly holds in (4) when the discount factor function β is nonnegative. In general,
Assumption 1.1 is a mild condition that holds for all problems we consider.
The next assumption is new and central to what follows.
Assumption 1.2 (Long-Run Contractivity). There exists a positive function β in bmZ
such that, for all v, w ∈ V , we have
|H(x, z, a, v)−H(x, z, a, w)| 6 β(z)
∫
sup
x′∈X
|v(x′, z′)− w(x′, z′)|Q(z, dz′) (9)
for all (x, z) ∈ S and a ∈ Γ(x, z). Moreover, β is such that the spectral radius r(Lβ) of
the linear operator Lβ : bmZ→ bmZ defined by
(Lβh)(z) = β(z)
∫
Z
h(z′)Q(z, dz′) (10)
satisfies r(Lβ) < 1.
Here bmZ is the set of all bounded measurable functions from Z to R, paired with the
supremum norm. As usual, the spectral radius of a linear operator L from bmZ to itself
6Q is called Feller if v ∈ bcZ implies z 7→ ∫ v(z′)Q(z,dz′) is in bcZ.
9is defined by r(L) = limn→∞ ‖Ln‖1/n, where ‖ · ‖ is the operator norm.7 The spectral
radius condition from Assumption 1.2 is shown in the appendix to be equivalent to
∃n ∈ N such that sup
z∈Z
Ez
n−1∏
t=0
β(Zt) < 1, (11)
where {Zt} is a Markov process generated by Q. In our applications, βt = β(Zt) will
have the interpretation of the time t value of the discount factor process.
Assumption 1.2 is the key condition of the paper. It is a generalization of the usual
(see, e.g., Bertsekas, 2013, Chapter 2) discounting condition
|H(x, z, a, v)−H(x, z, a, w)| 6 b ‖v − w‖ (12)
for some constant b < 1. This is easy to see because, if a b satisfying (12) exists, then
we can set β ≡ b as the function in Assumption 1.2. Evidently (9) then holds. In
addition (11) is immediate, so the spectral radius condition r(Lβ) < 1 also holds.
An extended discussion of the spectral radius condition r(Lβ) < 1, including how to
test it and how to understand its implications, is provided in Section 3.
2. Results
We can now state our main results. We provide a fundamental optimality result, as
well as a discussion of two standard algorithms: value function iteration and policy
function iteration.
2.1. Key Optimality Results. In the statement of the next theorem and all of what
follows, a map M from a metric space into itself is called eventually contracting if there
exists an n in N such that the n-th iterate Mn is a contraction mapping.8
Theorem 2.1. Let D be a regular dynamic program. If Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2 both
hold, then the following statements are true:
a. Tσ is eventually contracting on bmS and T is eventually contracting on bcS.
b. For each feasible policy σ, the lifetime value vσ is a well defined element of bmS.
c. The value function v∗ is well defined, bounded and continuous. Moreover, the
unique fixed point of T in bcS is v∗.
7This is the Gelfand representation of the spectral radius. See, for example, Krasnoselskii et al.
(1972), Ch. 1.
8More precisely, a self-map M on metric space (Y, ρ) is called eventually contracting if there exists
an n in N and a λ < 1 such that ρ(Mny,Mny′) 6 λρ(y, y′) for all y, y′ in Y .
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d. At least one optimal policy exists.
e. A policy σ ∈ Σ is optimal if and only if it satisfies
σ(x, z) ∈ arg max
a∈Γ(x,z)
H(x, z, a, v∗) for each (x, z) in S. (13)
This theorem extends the core results of dynamic programming theory to the case of
state-dependent discounting. In particular, the value function satisfies the Bellman
equation, an optimal policy exists, and Bellman’s principle of optimality is valid (i.e.,
part (e) holds). Iteration with the Bellman operator leads to the value function, so
that we have both existence of an optimal policy and a means to compute it.
Relative to the results that can be obtained under the standard one-step contraction
condition in (12), as found for instance in Chapter 2 of Bertsekas (2013), the only
significant weakening of the main findings is that T and Tσ are eventually contracting,
rather than always contracting in one step. This is due to the fact that values of the
discount factor greater than one are admitted, for reasons discussed in the introduction.
Only in the long run are we guaranteed of contraction.
The proof of Theorem 2.1 is deferred to the appendix. In the proof, we only adopt
regularity when necessary, so the results contained in the appendix also provide in-
formation on what can be said if the regularity condition is dropped. Throughout
the paper we restrict our attention to optimality over stationary policies—that is, the
agent chooses the same policy in every period, because stationary policies dominate
nonstationary ones. The proof is similar to the standard case and hence omitted. See,
for example, Chapter 2 of Bertsekas (2013).
2.2. Policy Iteration. Howard’s policy iteration algorithm generates a sequence of
feasible policies in the following way. Choose any σ0 ∈ Σ and define σk for k ∈ N by
Tσkvσk−1 = Tvσk−1 . (14)
The next proposition shows that, under the conditions adopted in Theorem 2.1, the
values of the policy sequence generated by Howard’s policy iteration algorithm converge
to the maximum possible.
Theorem 2.2. If the conditions of Theorem 2.1 hold and the policy sequence {σk}
satisfies (14), then vσk → v∗ uniformly as k →∞.
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3. Understanding the Long-Run Contractivity Condition
Assumption 1.2 is specifically designed to handle models with state-dependent discount
factors. Before moving on to such applications, we examine Assumption 1.2 in greater
depth. In particular, we wish to know the implications of and restrictions imposed by
the spectral radius condition r(Lβ) < 1 on a given discount factor process {βt}.
3.1. The Finite State Case. One common sub-case in terms of applications is the
setting where the exogenous state space Z is finite. In this case, the transition proba-
bility kernel Q can be represented as a Markov matrix of values Qij, giving the one-step
probability of transitioning from zi to zj. As can be seen from its definition in (10),
the linear operator Lβ can be represented as the matrix
Lβ := (βiQij)16i,j6N . (15)
Here βi := β(zi) and N is the number of elements in Z. The spectral radius of Lβ can
be computed using standard routines, first by computing the eigenvalues of the matrix
and next by taking the maximum in modulus.
For continuous state exogenous processes, the same procedure can be implemented
numerically after discretizing the process. The next section discusses such a case.
3.2. A Representative Discount Factor Process. It is often assumed that the
discount factor process obeys an AR(1) specification such as
βt+1 = ρβt + (1− ρ)µ+ σt+1, (16)
where −1 < ρ < 1, σ is positive and {t} is iid and standard normal (see, e.g., Hills
et al. (2016), Hubmer et al. (2018) or Schorfheide et al. (2018)). While this approach
is problematic in its original form, since the discount process can be negative and,
at the same time, is unbounded above, most quantitative analyses circumvent these
issues by discretization. In this section we do the same and then investigate the factors
that determine the size of r(Lβ). Discretization is carried out using the Rouwenhorst
method, which is well suited to highly correlated Gaussian AR(1) processes.9
Our benchmark parameterization is µ = 0.985, ρ = 0.99, and σβ = 0.01, where σβ is the
unconditional standard deviation of βt computed by σβ = σe/(
√
1− ρ2). At this pa-
rameterization, the method for finite exogenous state problems described above yields
9See, Kopecky and Suen (2010) for an exposition of the method and some of its properties. We set
the number of states N = 50, which as Kopecky and Suen (2010) show, is accurate enough for most
applications.
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Figure 1. r(Lβ) as a function of ρ and σβ; µ = 0.985
r(Lβ) = 0.995. Figure 1 plots values of r(Lβ) as a function of ρ and σβ, represented by
contour lines, while µ is held constant at its benchmark value. The main message of
the figure is that larger volatility and larger persistence both lead to a higher spectral
radius for Lβ, and the effect of increasing ρ becomes large when σβ is large.
What is the intuition behind this result? To gain some understanding, consider a
generic stationary discount factor process {βt} and let µ := Eβ0 be the common
mean. Suppose that the process exhibits positive autocorrelation. Then, for any t, the
variates βt and βt+1 are positively correlated, which is equivalent to the statement that
(Eβtβt+1)
1/2 > µ. For this bivariate case, then, positive correlation pushes the expected
geometric time series average above the stationary mean. Moreover, the inequality is
strict precisely when the joint distribution is not degenerate.
The situation is even clearer when we focus on the AR(1) model (16). In this case,
we have (Eβtβt+1)
1/2 = (µ2 + ρσ2β)
1/2 > µ. The key message is the same: positive
correlation and positive volatility push the expected geometric time series average
above the stationary mean. The impact increases with both ρ and σβ, and the two
effects reinforce each other.
The connection between this and r(Lβ) is that, as we show in (26) of the appendix, the
spectral radius of Lβ is in fact equal to an asymptotic long-run version of this geometric
average. Putting the pieces together, we can see why increased positive correlation and
13
increased volatility in the discount factor process tend to drive up r(Lβ) relative to the
stationary mean of βt, as seen in Figure 1.
3.3. Necessity of the Spectral Radius Condition. Consider a standard Markov
decision process (as in, say, Blackwell (1965)), where a controller seeks to maximize
an expression of the form E
∑
t>0 β
trt. Here β > 0 is a constant discount factor and
{rt} is a bounded sequence of rewards. In this setting, the condition β < 1 cannot
be relaxed without imposing specific conditions on rewards. For example, if there are
constants 0 < a 6 b such that a 6 rt 6 b for all t, then we clearly have10
E
∑
t>0
βtrt <∞ if and only if β < 1. (17)
The condition r(Lβ) < 1 has this same distinction once we replace the constant discount
factor β with a discount factor process {βt}, as long as we are prepared to impose some
regularity conditions. The next proposition gives one such result. In stating it, the
process {βt} and the operator Lβ are as defined in Assumption 1.2, while {rt} is as
just described.
Proposition 3.1. If the exogenous state space Z is compact and β is continuous, then
E
∑
t>0
t−1∏
i=0
βi rt <∞ if and only if r(Lβ) < 1. (18)
4. Applications
In this section we turn to applications of Theorems 2.1–2.2.
4.1. One-Sector Stochastic Optimal Growth. Recall the stochastic optimal growth
model with state-dependent discounting from Example 1.1. If u and f satisfy standard
conditions, as in, say, Section 5.1 of Stokey et al. (1989), then the dynamic program
is regular. The monotonicity condition in Assumption 1.1 certainly holds. Regarding
Assumption 1.2, since H is given by (4), we have
|H(x, z, a, v)−H(x, z, a, w)| = β(z)
∣∣∣∣∫ [v(a, z′)− w(a, z′)]Q(z, dz′)∣∣∣∣
6 β(z)
∫
|v(a, z′)− w(a, z′)|Q(z, dz′)
6 β(z)
∫
sup
x′∈X
|v(x′, z′)− w(x′, z′)|Q(z, dz′).
10The equivalence in (17) is easy to see because, by the Monotone Convergence Theorem, we have
E
∑
t>0 β
trt =
∑
t>0 β
t
Ert and, moreover, 0 < a 6 Ert 6 b.
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Here the first inequality is by the triangle inequality for integrals and the second is
obvious. Hence, if the process βt satisfies r(Lβ) < 1, then Assumption 1.2 also holds,
and so do the conclusions of Theorems 2.1–2.2. Conditions under which r(Lβ) < 1
holds were discussed in Section 3.
4.2. Job Search. Our framework is also able to deal with optimal stopping problems
with proper definitions of the primitives. In this section, we demonstrate this using
an elementary job search problem in McCall (1970) except that the agent has state-
dependent discount factors. The basic structure considered here can be modified to
deal with more complicated optimal stopping problems, such as Lucas and Prescott
(1974) and Robin (2011).
An unemployed worker searching for a job is given a wage offer every period. He can
accept the offer and receive this wage every period forever, or he can choose to receive
an unemployment compensation c and wait for another offer next period. Uncertainty
is driven by a Markov process on a metric space Z with stochastic kernel Q. The wage
offer is given by a function w : Z→ R+. Since the discount factors are state dependent,
the lifetime utility of accepting an offer at state z is K(z)w(z) where
K(z) :=
∞∑
t=0
(
Ez
t−1∏
i=0
β(Zi)
)
, ∀z ∈ Z.
The Bellman equation is thus
v(z) = max
{
w(z)K(z), c+ β(z)
∫
Z
v(z′)Q(z, dz′)
}
.
We can translate this problem to our framework by letting S = Z, A = {0, 1}, Γ ≡ A,
and
H(x, z, a, v) = aw(z)K(z) + (1− a)
[
c+ β(z)
∫
Z
v(z′)Q(z, dz′)
]
.
Then D = (X,Z,A,Γ, H,V) is the associated dynamic program with V = bmS. Note
that in this setting, the state space X is redundant. In particular, the Bellman operator
defined from D is
(Tv)(z) = max
a∈{0,1}
{
aw(z)K(z) + (1− a)
[
c+ β(z)
∫
Z
v(z′)Q(z, dz′)
]}
(19)
= max
{
w(z)K(z), c+ β(z)
∫
Z
v(z′)Q(z, dz′)
}
.
We have the following proposition.
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Proposition 4.1. If (i) w and β are bounded and continuous, (ii) r(Lβ) < 1 where
Lβ is defined in (10), and (iii) Q has the Feller property, then D is regular and As-
sumptions 1.1–1.2 hold. In particular, the conclusions of Theorems 2.1–2.2 are valid.
4.3. A Household Problem with Taxation. Consider the household problem in
Hills and Nakata (2018), where u : R+ → R is one-period utility and the discount
factor at time t is βt. The agent chooses consumption {Ct} and risk-free asset {Bt} to
solve
max
{Ct,Bt}∞t=0
E
{ ∞∑
t=0
t−1∏
i=0
βi u(Ct)
}
subject to the constraint
Ct +
Bt+1
RtPt
6 Bt
Pt
+ Tt.
The interest rate Rt, price level Pt, and lump-sum tax Tt are taken as given by the
agent. We suppose that Rt = R(Zt), Pt = P (Zt), Tt = T (Zt) and βt = β(Zt), where
{Zt} is a Markov process on metric space Z with transition kernel Q and R,P, T and
β are Borel measurable functions. Let X = A be a compact subset of R+ and assume
that R and P are bounded below away from zero. Define
H(x, z, a, v) = u(F (x, z, a)) + β(z)
∫
Z
v(a, z′)Q(z, dz′),
where
F (x, z, a) =
x
P (z)
+ T (z)− a
R(z)P (z)
corresponds to consumption given current-period asset x, next-period asset a, and
shock z. Define the feasible correspondence by
Γ(x, z) = [0, xR(z) + T (z)R(z)P (z)] .
Let S = X×Z and let D = (X,Z,A,Γ, H,V) be the associated dynamic program, where
the class of candidate value functions V is equal to bmS.
Proposition 4.2. If (i) R, P , T , and β are bounded and continuous, (ii) u is contin-
uous, (iii) r(Lβ) < 1 where Lβ is defined in (10), and (iv) Q has the Feller property,
then D is regular and Assumptions 1.1–1.2 hold. In particular, the conclusions of
Theorems 2.1–2.2 are valid.
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4.4. Recursive Preferences. Consider the Epstein-Zin utility with discount factor
shocks studied in Albuquerque et al. (2016). The lifetime utility11 of the agent at time
t has a recursive formulation:
Ut = max
Ct
{
C1−ρt + βt
[
EtU
1−γ
t+1
] 1−ρ
1−γ
} 1
1−ρ
.
Uncertainty in the economy is driven by a sequence of Markovian shocks {Zt} on Z
with stochastic kernel Q. There is a single risky asset in unit supply with price p(z)
and dividend d(z) given shock z. In each period, the agent maximizes lifetime utility
subject to budget constraint
Ct + p(Zt)Xt+1 6 d(Zt)Xt + p(Zt)Xt
where Xt is asset holding of the agent at time t. Given d and p, we seek a solution to
the Bellman equation
v(x, z) = max
a∈Γ(x,z)
{
F (x, z, a)1−ρ + β(z)
[∫
v(a, z′)1−γQ(z, dz′)
] 1−ρ
1−γ
} 1
1−ρ
, (20)
where F (x, z, a) = d(z)x+p(z)(x−a) corresponds to consumption given current-period
asset x, next-period asset a, and shock z, and
Γ(x, z) =
{
a : 0 6 a 6 min
[
1,
d(z)x+ p(z)x
p(z)
]}
is the constraint12 on asset holding. We consider the case where ρ < γ < 1 so that util-
ities are positive and work on v˜ = v1−γ instead. Since v˜ = v1−γ is a strictly increasing
transformation, for positive value functions the two formulations are equivalent.
To study this problem in our theoretical framework, let X = A = R+ and define
H(x, z, a, v˜) =
{
F (x, z, a)1−ρ + β(z)
[∫
Z
v˜(a, z′)Q(z, dz′)
] 1
θ
}θ
where θ = (1 − γ)/(1 − ρ) ∈ (0, 1). Then (20) can be written as v˜ = T v˜ where T is
defined in (6). Let S = X × Z and V = bmS. This problem can be formulated as a
dynamic program D = (X,Z,A,Γ, H,V). Define operator Lθ by
Lθh(z) := β(z)
θ
∫
Z
h(z′)Q(z, dz′). (21)
We have the following proposition.
11We use an alternative formulation of the recursive utility in their paper; see footnote 9 in Albu-
querque et al. (2016).
12Asset holding cannot exceed one due to its fixed supply.
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Proposition 4.3. If (i) d, p, and β are bounded and continuous, (ii) r(Lθ) < 1
where Lθ is defined in (21), and (iii) Q has the Feller property, then D is regular
and Assumptions 1.1–1.2 hold. In particular, the conclusions of Theorems 2.1–2.2 are
valid.
5. Extensions
In this section, we let X = A, and consider aggregators of the form
H(x, z, a, v) = u(x, z, a) + β(z)
∫
Z
v(a, z′)Q(z, dz′) (22)
where u is continuous but not necessarily bounded. All the other primitives are as
defined in Section 1.1. Since value functions are not in bmS in this case, the associated
dynamic program D is no longer regular and most results in Section 2 do not apply.
We shall discuss two approaches that are common in dealing with dynamic program-
ming with unbounded rewards. The first one is in the spirit of Stokey et al. (1989,
Section 9.3) and Alvarez and Stokey (1998) that treat homogeneous programs. The
second one uses a local contraction method. Each approach considers a different space
for candidate value functions and establishes contraction of the Bellman operator on
the new space when β is constant. This section aims to show that the Bellman opera-
tor is eventually contracting in the face of state-dependent discount factors as long as
proper spectral conditions similar to Assumption 1.2 are satisfied.
5.1. Homogeneous Functions. Consider dynamic programming problems with re-
turn functions that are homogeneous of degree θ ∈ (0, 1] and feasible correspondences
that are homogeneous of degree one. In particular, we have the following standard
assumption.
Assumption 5.1. The feasible correspondence Γ is continuous, nonempty, and com-
pact valued, and for any (x, z) ∈ S,
a ∈ Γ(x, z) =⇒ γa ∈ Γ(γx, z), ∀γ > 0.
The return function u is continuous, u(·, z, ·) is homogeneous of degree θ, and there
exists B > 0 such that for any (x, z) ∈ S
|u(x, z, a)| 6 B(‖x‖+ ‖a‖), ∀a ∈ Γ(x, z).
The next assumption is a generalization of the standard growth restriction to problems
with state-dependent discount factors. Note that if both β and α are constant, r(Lα) <
1 regresses to the familiar condition αθβ < 1.
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Assumption 5.2. There exists a bounded measurable function α : Z→ R+ such that
‖a‖ 6 α(z)‖x‖, ∀a ∈ Γ(x, z),∀(x, z) ∈ S.
The operator Lα : bmZ→ bmZ defined by
Lα(z) := β(z)α
θ(z)
∫
Z
h(z′)Q(z, dz′) (23)
satisfies that r(Lα) < 1.
Let (H(S; θ), ‖ ·‖) be the space of bounded continuous functions that are homogeneous
of degree θ with norm defined by
‖f‖ := sup
z∈Z
sup
x∈X, ‖x‖=1
|f(x, z)|. (24)
Then H(S; θ) is a Banach space (Stokey et al., 1989). We have the following result.
Proposition 5.1. Let V = H(S; θ) and D = (X,Z,A,Γ, H,V) be the associated dy-
namic program. Under Assumptions 5.1 and 5.2, the lifetime value vσ(x0, z0) is well
defined and finite for any initial state (x0, z0) and feasible policy σ, the value function
v∗ is a unique fixed point of T on V, T nv → v∗ for all v ∈ V, there exists an optimal
stationary policy, and the principle of optimality holds.
Example 5.1. Consider the household saving problem in Toda (2018) without restrict-
ing the shock space to be finite. Instead, we assume that the shocks are Markovian
with stochastic kernel Q on an arbitrary metric space Z. The asset return R(z) and
discount function β(z) are bounded continuous functions of the shocks. The utility
function is u(c) = c1−γ/(1 − γ) and we assume that γ ∈ (0, 1). The budget con-
straint is Xt+1 = R(Zt)(Xt − Ct) where Xt is the beginning-of-period wealth, Ct is
consumption, and Zt is shock at time t. The Bellman equation is thus
v(x, z) = sup
x′∈[0,R(z)x]
u
(
x− x
′
R(z)
)
+ β(z)
∫
Z
v(x′, z′)Q(z, dz′).
Then Assumption 5.1 is satisfied and so is Assumption 5.2 if r(LR) < 1 with LR defined
by
LR(z) := β(z)R
1−γ(z)
∫
Z
h(z′)Q(z, dz′).
This is equivalent to the spectral radius condition13 in Proposition 1 of Toda (2018) if
Z is finite.
13The condition in Toda (2018) is r(DP ) < 1 where D = diag(β1R
1−γ
1 , . . . , βSR
1−γ
S ) and P is the
transition matrix. Also see discussion in Section 3.2.
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5.2. Local Contractions. Next we take a local contraction approach to dynamic pro-
grams with state dependent discounting and unbounded rewards. We follow the meth-
ods pioneered in Rinco´n-Zapatero and Rodr´ıguez-Palmero (2003), Martins-da Rocha
and Vailakis (2010) and Matkowski and Nowak (2011) for the constant discount case.
Let C(S) be the space of continuous functions on S. Assume that Z is compact and
X =
⋃
j Int(Kj) where {Kj} is a sequence of strictly increasing and compact subsets of
X. Define ‖ · ‖j by
‖f‖j = sup
x∈Kj ,z∈Z
|f(x, z)|, ∀f ∈ C(S).
Let c > 1 and {mj} be an unbounded sequence of increasing positive real numbers.
Let Cm(S) be the space of all f ∈ C(S) such that
‖f‖ :=
∞∑
j=1
‖f‖j
mjcj
<∞.
Then (Cm(S), ‖ · ‖) is a Banach space (Matkowski and Nowak, 2011).
Assumption 5.3. Γ is continuous, nonempty, and compact valued, β is bounded, u
is continuous, and Q is Feller.
Assumption 5.4. Γ(x, z) ⊂ Kj for all x ∈ Kj, all z ∈ Z, and all j ∈ N, and r(Lβ) < 1
where Lβ is defined in (10).
Proposition 5.2. Let V = Cm(S) and D = (X,Z,A,Γ, H,V) be the associated dynamic
program. Under Assumptions 5.3 and 5.4, the lifetime value vσ(x0, z0) is well defined
and finite for any initial state (x0, z0) and feasible policy σ, there exists an increasing
unbounded sequence {mj} such that the value function v∗ is the unique fixed point of
T on V, T nv → v∗ for all v ∈ V, there exists an optimal stationary policy, and the
principle of optimality holds.
Example 5.2. Consider Example 1.114 with production function f(k, z) = zf(k),
discount function β(z), and utility u any (unbounded) continuous function. Let X =
A = R+ and Z be a compact subset of R+. Suppose f is positive, strictly concave in
k, and limk→∞ f ′(k) = 0. Then we can find a sequence15 {Kj} of strictly increasing
and compact sets covering X such that Γ(k, z) ⊂ Kj for all x ∈ Kj. Furthermore, if β
satisfies r(Lβ) < 1, then Proposition 5.2 can be applied.
14Also see Matkowski and Nowak (2011) for a similar example with constant β.
15For example, Kj = [0,M + j] for some large M .
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6. Conclusion
We provide a simple spectral radius condition under which standard infinite horizon dy-
namic programs with state-dependent discount rates are well defined and well behaved.
In particular, under the stated condition, the value function satisfies the Bellman equa-
tion, an optimal policy exists and Bellman’s principle of optimality is valid. Thus, the
spectral radius condition we state is the natural analog of the condition β < 1 in the
traditional setting, where the discount factor β is not state-dependent. Several appli-
cations were provided, including those with both bounded and unbounded rewards.
Appendix A. Remaining Proofs
In what follows, we consider the dynamic program described in Section 1.1. We will
at times make use of the following lemma.
Lemma A.1. The function β yields r(Lβ) < 1 if and only if (11) holds.
Proof. Let 1 ≡ 1 on Z. For each z ∈ Z and n ∈ N, an inductive argument gives
Ez
n−1∏
t=0
β(Zt) = L
n
β1(z). (25)
Thus, condition (11) can be written as ‖Lnβ1‖ < 1 for some n ∈ N. Applying Theo-
rem 9.1 of Krasnoselskii et al. (1972), since (i) Lβ is a positive linear operator on bmZ,
(ii) the positive cone in this set is solid and normal under the pointwise partial order16,
and (iii) 1 lies interior to the positive cone in bmZ, we have
r(Lβ) = lim
n→∞
‖Lnβ1‖1/n = lim
n→∞
{
sup
z∈Z
Ez
n−1∏
t=0
β(Zt)
}1/n
, (26)
where the second equality is due to (25), nonnegativity of β and the definition of the
supremum norm. It follows immediately that r(Lβ) < 1 implies the condition in (11).
16A cone is solid if it has an interior point; it is normal if 0 6 x 6 y implies that ‖x‖ 6M‖y‖. The
cone of nonnegative functions in bmZ is both solid and normal.
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To see that the converse is true, suppose there exists n ∈ N such that (11) holds. Then
it follows from the Markov property that
r(Lβ) = lim
m→∞
{
sup
z∈Z
Ez
m−1∏
t=0
β(Zt)
}1/m
= lim
m→∞
{
sup
z∈Z
Ez
n−1∏
t=0
β(Zt)
[
EZn−1
m−1∏
t=n
β(Zt)
]}1/m
6 lim
m→∞
{
sup
z∈Z
Ez
n−1∏
t=0
β(Zt) sup
z∈Z
Ez
m−n−1∏
t=0
β(Zt)
}1/m
=
{
sup
z∈Z
Ez
n−1∏
t=0
β(Zt)
}1/n
< 1. 
A.1. Proofs for Section 2.
A.1.1. General Results. We begin with a set of dynamic programming results in an
abstract setting that does not impose regularity. Recall from Section 1.1 that V is a
subset of bmS.
Assumption A.1. V is a complete metric space under the sup metric and the operator
Tσ is a self map on V for all σ ∈ Σ. There exists a closed subset Vˆ ⊂ V equipped with
the sup metric on which T is a self map.
Theorem A.2. Under Assumptions 1.2 and A.1, there exists n ∈ N such that Tσ and
T are n-step contraction mappings on V and Vˆ, respectively.
Proof. In view of Tσ defined in (5), Assumption 1.2 implies that for any v, w ∈ V and
any n ∈ Z
|(T nσ v)(x0, z0)− (T nσw)(x0, z0)|
=
∣∣H (x0, z0, σ(x0, z0), T n−1σ v)−H (x0, z0, σ(x0, z0), T n−1σ w)∣∣
6 β(z0)
∫
Z
sup
x1∈X
|(T n−1σ v)(x1, z1)− (T n−1σ w)(x1, z1)|Q(z0, dz1).
Iterating on the above inequality gives
|(T nσ v)(x0, z0)− (T nσw)(x0, z0)|
6 β(z0)
∫
Z
[
β(z1)
∫
Z
sup
x2∈X
|(T n−2σ v)(x2, z2)− (T n−2σ w)(x2, z2)|Q(z1, dz2)
]
Q(z0, dz1).
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It follows from an inductive argument that
|(T nσ v)(x0, z0)− (T nσw)(x0, z0)| 6 Ez0
n−1∏
t=0
β(zt) sup
xn∈X
|v(xn, zn)− w(xn, zn)|
6 Ez0
n−1∏
t=0
β(zt)‖v − w‖.
Taking the supremum gives
‖T nσ v − T nσw‖ 6 sup
z0∈Z
Ez0
n−1∏
t=0
β(zt)‖v − w‖.
Since Lemma A.1 implies that (11) holds for some n, Tσ is an n-step contraction on V .
As to the Bellman operator T defined in (6), we have
|(Tv)(x0, z0)− (Tw)(x0, z0)| =
∣∣∣ sup
a∈Γ(x0,z0)
H(x0, z0, a, v)− sup
a∈Γ(x0,z0)
H(x0, z0, a, w)
∣∣∣
6 sup
a∈Γ(x0,z0)
|H(x0, z0, a, v)−H(x0, z0, a, w)| ,
for all v, w ∈ Vˆ . It then follows from Assumption 1.2 that
|(T nv)(x0, z0)− (T nw)(x0, z0)|
6 sup
a∈Γ(x0,z0)
∣∣H(x0, z0, a, T n−1v)−H(x0, z0, a, T n−1w)∣∣
6 β(z0)
∫
Z
sup
x1∈X
|(T n−1v)(x1, z1)− (T n−1w)(x1, z1)|Q(z0, dz1).
Iterating on the above inequality gives
|(T nv)(x0, z0)− (T nw)(x0, z0)|
6 β(z0)
∫
Z
[
β(z1)
∫
Z
sup
x2∈X
|(T n−2v)(x2, z2)− (T n−2w)(x2, z2)|Q(z1, dz2)
]
Q(z0, dz1).
A similar inductive argument shows that
‖T nv − T nw‖ 6 sup
z0∈Z
Ez0
n−1∏
t=0
β(zt)‖v − w‖.
In light of Lemma A.1, T is an n-step contraction on Vˆ . 
We have the following immediate corollary.
Corollary A.3. If v0 ∈ V, the σ-value function vσ is the unique fixed point of Tσ in
V. The Bellman operator T has a unique fixed point v¯ in Vˆ. Moreover, T nσ v → vσ for
all v ∈ V and T nw → v¯ for all w ∈ Vˆ.
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Proof. By Assumption A.1 and a generalized Contraction Mapping Theorem (see, e.g.,
Cheney, 2013, Section 4.2), Tσ and T are globally stable on V and Vˆ respectively.
Hence, if v0 ∈ V , vσ is the unique fixed point of Tσ in V by definition and T nσ v → vσ for
all v ∈ V . Similarly, T has a unique fixed point v¯ ∈ Vˆ and T nv → vσ for all v ∈ Vˆ . 
Corollary A.3 establishes the global stability of T and Tσ. Moreover, it shows that the
unique fixed point of Tσ is the σ-value function, the lifetime utility to be optimized.
They are both crucial in deriving our next optimality result.
Theorem A.4. Under Assumptions 1.1, 1.2, and A.1, if v0 ∈ V and there exists some
σ ∈ Σ such that Tσv¯ = T v¯, then v¯ = v∗ and σ is the optimal policy.
Proof. First note that v¯(x, z) = (T v¯)(x, z) > (Tσv¯)(x, z) for all x ∈ X, z ∈ Z, and
σ ∈ Σ by definition. Iterating Tσ on both sides and using Assumption 1.1, we have
v¯(x, z) > T nσ v¯(x, z), ∀x ∈ X, z ∈ Z
for all n ∈ Z. It follows from corollary A.3 that v¯(x, z) > vσ(x, z) for all x ∈ X, z ∈ Z,
and σ ∈ Σ. Taking the supremum over Σ gives v¯ > v∗.
For the other direction, since there exists σ ∈ Σ such that Tσv¯ = T v¯, we have Tσv¯ = v¯.
Because v¯ ∈ Vˆ ⊂ V and Tσ has a unique fixed point in V , v¯ = vσ. By the definition
of v∗, we have v∗ > vσ = v¯. Therefore, vσ = v∗ = v¯. By definition, σ is the optimal
policy. 
A.1.2. Regular Dynamic Programs. Next we derive some nice properties for regular
dynamic programs so that the assumptions of Theorem A.4 can be easily verified.
Proposition A.5. If D is a regular dynamic program (see Section 1.3) and Assump-
tion 1.2 holds, then Assumption A.1 holds with Vˆ = bcS and for all v ∈ Vˆ there exists
σ ∈ Σ such that Tσv = Tv.
Proof of Proposition A.5. Since S is a metric space, V = bmS and Vˆ = bcS are complete
metric spaces under the sup metric.
By definition, for all σ ∈ Σ and all v ∈ V we have
Tσv(x, z) = H(x, z, σ(x, z), v).
The regularity of the dynamic program together with the measurability of all σ ∈ Σ
implies that Tσv is measurable. Since there exists v
′ ∈ bcS such that (x, z, a) 7→
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H(x, z, a, x) is bounded, we have
|H(x, z, σ(x, z), v)| 6 |H(x, z, σ(x, z), v)−H(x, z, σ(x, z), v′)|+ |H(x, z, σ(x, z), v′)|
6 β(z)‖v − v′‖+ |H(x, z, σ(x, z), v′)| <∞
where the last two inequalities follow from assumption 1.2. Hence, Tσ is a self map on
V for all σ ∈ Σ.
To show that T is a self map on Vˆ , we use the maximum theorem. Since Γ is continuous,
nonempty, and compact valued, and (x, z, a) 7→ H(x, z, a, v) is continuous for all v ∈ Vˆ ,
Tv defined by
Tv(x, z) = sup
a∈Γ(x,z)
H(x, z, a, v)
is continuous. The boundedness of Tv can be derived similarly as above.
Finally, to show the last part, we need the maximizer correspondence to admit a mea-
surable selection. The fact that (x, z, a) 7→ H(x, z, a, v) is continuous for all v ∈ Vˆ , A
is a separable metric space, and Γ is continuous, nonempty, and compact valued en-
sures that we can apply the measurable maximum theorem (see, for example, Theorem
18.19 in Aliprantis and Border (2006)). Hence, for all v ∈ Vˆ there exists a measurable
maximizer σ such that Tσv = Tv. 
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Since D is a regular dynamic program and Assumption 1.2
holds, it follows from Proposition A.5 that Assumption A.1 holds with Vˆ = bcS and
for all v ∈ Vˆ there exists σ ∈ Σ such that Tσv = Tv. Then Theorem 2.1 follows from
applying Theorem A.2, Corollary A.3, and Theorem A.4. 
A.1.3. Policy Iterations.
Proposition A.6. Suppose there exists Σˆ ⊂ Σ such that for all σ ∈ Σˆ, we have vσ ∈ Vˆ.
Suppose for all v ∈ Vˆ, there exists σ ∈ Σˆ such that Tσv = Tv. Let {σk}∞k=0 be generated
by the policy iteration algorithm with σ0 ∈ Σˆ. Under Assumptions 1.1, 1.2, and A.1,
vσk → v∗.
Proof. The proof is adapted from Bertsekas (2013, Proposition 2.4.1). Since σ0 ∈ Σˆ,
it follows from the assumptions that all σk ∈ Σˆ and all vσk ∈ Vˆ . By definition,
Tσkvσk−1 = Tvσk−1 > Tσk−1vσk−1 = vσk−1 . By Assumption 1.1, applying Tσk to both
sides repeatedly gives T nσkvσk−1 > Tvσk−1 > vσk−1 . Taking n to infinity, it follows
from Corollary A.3 that vσk > Tvσk−1 > vσk−1 . An inductive argument implies that
v∗ > vσk > T kvσ0 . Taking k to infinity, Corollary A.3 then implies that vσk → v∗. 
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The purpose of the assumptions for Proposition A.6 is to ensure that the policies
generated by the algorithm are well defined. We can impose further convexity condition
on Γ and concavity condition on H to make the assumptions hold. See Stokey et al.
(1989, Chapter 9) for examples of such conditions in more specific models.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Since D is regular and satisfies Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2, it
follows from Proposition A.5 that Assumption A.1 holds. Then the rest follows from
applying Proposition A.6. 
A.2. Proofs for Section 3.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Suppose first that r(Lβ) < 1. Then, since rt 6 b, we have
E
∑
t>0
t−1∏
i=0
βi rt 6 b
∑
t>0
E
t−1∏
i=0
βi 6 b
∑
t>0
sup
z
Ez
t−1∏
i=0
βi.
Let mt := supz Ez
∏t−1
i=0 βi. By Cauchy’s root convergence criterion, the sum
∑
t>0mt
will be finite whenever lim supn→∞m
1/n
n < 1. This does in fact hold when r(Lβ) < 1,
in view of (26).
Now suppose instead that r(Lβ) > 1. By compactness of Lβ, positivity of the function
β from Assumption 1.2 and the Krein–Rutman Theorem (see, e.g., Theorem 1.2 in Du
(2006)), there exists an everywhere positive function e ∈ bcZ such that Lβe = r(Lβ)e.
Choosing γ > 0 such that γe 6 1 holds pointwise on Z, we have
E
∑
t>0
t−1∏
i=0
βi rt > a
∑
t>0
Ltβ1(z0) > aγ
∑
t>0
Ltβe(z0) > aγ
∑
t>0
r(Lβ)
te(z0).
(Here z0 is the initial condition of the state process {Zt}.) Since e is everywhere positive
and r(Lβ) > 1, the sum diverges to infinity. 
A.3. Proofs for Section 4. We first prove a useful lemma.
Lemma A.7. If r(Lβ) < 1 where Lβ is defined in (10), then we have
∞∑
t=1
sup
z∈Z
Ez
(
t−1∏
i=0
β(Zi)
)
<∞.
Proof. Since r(Lβ) < 1, Lemma A.1 yields an N ∈ N such that supz∈ZEz
∏n−1
t=0 β(Zt) <
1 for all n > N . Let
α := sup
z∈Z
Ez
N−1∏
t=0
β(Zt) < 1 and M := sup
z∈Z,i6N
Ez
i−1∏
t=0
β(Zt) <∞.
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Then we have, for any n,
sup
z∈Z
Ez
n−1∏
t=0
β(Zt) = sup
z∈Z
Ez
(
N−1∏
t=0
β(Zt)EZN−1
n−1∏
i=N
β(Zi)
)
6 α sup
z∈Z
EzEZN−1
n−1∏
i=N
β(Zi)
6 α sup
z∈Z
Ez
n−N−1∏
t=0
β(Zt) 6 αmM
where n = mN + i for some m ∈ Z and i < N . Therefore,
∞∑
t=1
sup
z∈Z
Ez
(
t−1∏
i=0
β(Zi)
)
6 NM + αNM + . . . = NM
1− α <∞. 
Proof of Proposition 4.1. For any v1, v2 ∈ bcS, we have
|H(x, z, a, v1)−H(x, z, a, v2)| = (1− a)β(z)
∣∣∣∣∫
Z
(v1(z
′)− v2(z′))Q(z, dz′)
∣∣∣∣
6 β(z)
∫
Z
|v1(z′)− v2(z′)|Q(z, dz′).
Then Assumption 1.2 is satisfied. It is apparent that Assumption 1.1 also holds and
the feasible correspondence Γ ≡ {0, 1} is continuous, nonempty, and compact valued.
It follows from Lemma A.7 that K(z) is well defined and finite for all z ∈ Z. Since w
and β are bounded and continuous and Q is Feller, D is regular if we can show that K
is continuous.
Since Q is Feller, SN(z) :=
∑N
t=1Ez
∏t−1
i=0 β(Zi) is bounded and continuous for all
N ∈ N. Since SN is nonnegative, it follows from Tonelli’s theorem that limN→∞ SN
is continuous. Therefore, K is continuous and D is a regular dynamic program. The
proposition then follows from Theorem 2.1 and 2.2. 
Proof of Proposition 4.2. It is obvious that Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2 hold. Next we
check that D is regular so that we can apply Theorem 2.1. Since R, T , and P are
bounded and continuous, Γ is continuous, nonempty, and compact valued. Since β and
u(F (·)) is bounded and continuous, and Q has the Feller property, (c) of the regularity
requirements is also satisfied (Stokey et al., 1989, Lemma 12.14). The rest follows from
Theorem 2.1 and 2.2. 
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Proof of Proposition 4.3. Consider the function f : R+ → R+ defined by f(x) =
(a+ x
1
θ )θ. Since θ ∈ (0, 1), f is strictly increasing and strictly convex and we have
|f(x)− f(y)| 6 |x− y|, ∀x, y ∈ R+.
Hence, H satisfies that
|H(x, z, a, v)−H(x, z, a, w)| 6
∣∣∣∣β(z)θ ∫
Z
[v(a, z′)− w(a, z′)]Q(z, dz′)
∣∣∣∣
6 β(z)θ
∫
Z
|v(a, z′)− w(a, z′)|Q(z, dz′)
6 β(z)θ
∫
Z
sup
x′∈X
|v(x′, z′)− w(x′, z′)|Q(z, dz′).
Then Assumption 1.2 hold when r(Lθ) < 1.
Since d and p are bounded and continuous, Γ is continuous, nonempty, and compact
valued. The space X and A are compact due to Γ, so F is bounded and continuous.
Since Q is Feller and β is bounded and continuous, the dynamic program is regular.
Then the rest follows from Theorems 2.1 and 2.2. 
A.4. Proofs for Section 5.
Proof of Proposition 5.1. We first show that T is eventually contracting on V = H(S; θ).
By Assumption 5.1, T maps V to itself. Note that for any v ∈ V , we have v(x, z) =
‖x‖θv(x/‖x‖, z). It follows from Assumption 5.2 that for any v, w ∈ V ,
|(T nv)(x0, z0)− (T nw)(x0, z0)|
6 sup
x1∈Γ(x0,z0)
β(z0)
∫
Z
∣∣(T n−1v)(x1, z1)− (T n−1w)(x1, z1)∣∣Q(z0, dz1)
6 sup
x1∈Γ(x0,z0)
β(z0)
∫
Z
‖x1‖θ
∣∣∣∣(T n−1v)( x1‖x1‖ , z1
)
− (T n−1w)
(
x1
‖x1‖ , z1
)∣∣∣∣Q(z0, dz1)
6 sup
x1∈Γ(x0,z0)
β(z0)α
θ(z0)‖x0‖θ
∫
Z
∣∣∣∣(T n−1v)( x1‖x1‖ , z1
)
− (T n−1w)
(
x1
‖x1‖ , z1
)∣∣∣∣Q(z0, dz1).
An inductive argument gives that
|(T nv)(x0, z0)− (T nw)(x0, z0)|
6 ‖x0‖θ sup
x1∈Γ(x0,z0)
Ez0
n−1∏
t=0
β(zt)α
θ(zt)
∣∣∣∣v( xn‖xn‖ , zn
)
− w
(
xn
‖xn‖ , zn
)∣∣∣∣
6 ‖x0‖θ
(
Ez0
n−1∏
t=0
β(zt)α
θ(zt)
)
‖v − w‖
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where the norm ‖ · ‖ is defined in (24). Therefore, we have
‖T nv − T nw‖ 6 sup
z0∈Z
(
Ez0
n−1∏
t=0
β(zt)α
θ(zt)
)
‖v − w‖.
Since r(Lα) < 1, T is eventually contracting on V by Lemma A.1. Hence, T has a
unique fixed point v¯ on V and T nv → v¯ for any v ∈ V . Similarly, Tσ is also eventually
contracting on V for any σ ∈ Σ and thus vσ(x0, z0) is well defined and finite. Since
we can find σ ∈ Σ such that Tσv¯ = T v¯ by the measurable maximum theorem, the
optimality results follow from Theorem A.4. 
Proof of Proposition 5.2. Define
uj(x, z) := max
a∈Γ(x,z)
|u(x, z, a)| if x ∈ Kj and rj := sup
x∈Kj ,z∈Z
uj(x, z).
Since u is continuous and every Kj is compact, rj <∞ for all j. For any initial state
(x0, z0), we can find j such that x0 ∈ Kj. It follows from Assumption 5.4 that∣∣u (pit−1(zt−1), zt, pit(zt))∣∣ 6 rj
for all t ∈ N.
Choose any increasing and unbounded {mj} such that mj > rj. Since Q is Feller, Tv
is continuous on every Kj for v ∈ Cm(S). It follows from Remark 1(a) of Matkowski
and Nowak (2011) that T : Cm(S)→ C(S).
Since Γ(x, z) ⊂ Kj for all x ∈ Kj, we have on Kj
|(T nv)(x, z)− (T nw)(x, z)| 6 sup
a∈Γ(x,z)
β(z)
∫
Z
|T n−1v(a, z′)− T n−1w(a, z′)|Q(z, dz′)
6 sup
a∈Kj
β(z)
∫
Z
|T n−1v(a, z′)− T n−1w(a, z′)|Q(z, dz′)
6 β(z)‖T n−1v − T n−1w‖j.
An inductive argument gives
|(T nv)(x, z)− (T nw)(x, z)| 6 Ez
n−1∏
t=0
β(Zt)‖v − w‖j.
Taking the supremum, we have
‖T nv − T nw‖j 6 sup
z∈Z
Ez
n−1∏
t=0
β(Zt)‖v − w‖j.
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Since r(Lβ) < 1, T is a 0-local contraction
17 by Lemma A.1. Then it follows from
Proposition 1 of Matkowski and Nowak (2011) that T has a unique fixed point v¯ in
Cm(S). It can be proved in the same way that Tσ is also a 0-local contraction and
hence vσ is well defined and finite for any initial state. Since we can find σ such that
Tσv¯ = T v¯ by the measurable maximum theorem, the optimality results follow from a
similar argument to the proofs of Theorem A.4. 
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